Related papers: Observing Actions in Bayesian Games
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
I study a game of strategic exploration with private payoffs and public actions in a Bayesian bandit setting. In particular, I look at cascade equilibria, in which agents switch over time from the risky action to the riskless action only…
Fully cooperative multiagent systems - those in which agents share a joint utility model- is of special interest in AI. A key problem is that of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coordinated, especially in settings where…
This work introduces an online Bayesian game-theoretic method for behavior identification in multi-agent dynamical systems. By casting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman optimality conditions as linear-in-parameter residuals, the method enables fast…
Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…
We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2X2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are: the…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
We consider a model of Bayesian observational learning in which a sequence of agents receives a private signal about an underlying binary state of the world. Each agent makes a decision based on its own signal and its observations of…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…