Related papers: Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games

We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from an owner) on a social network. We examine incentives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic models where each node decides whether…

This paper explores an idea of demand-supply balance for smart grids in which consumers are expected to play a significant role. The main objective is to motivate the consumer, by maximizing their benefit both as a seller and a buyer, to…

Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…

While social networks are widely used as a media for information diffusion, attackers can also strategically employ analytical tools, such as influence maximization, to maximize the spread of adversarial content through the networks. We…

Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote…

This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…

To exploit users' heterogeneous data demands, several mobile network operators worldwide have launched the mobile data trading markets, where users can trade mobile data quota with each other. In this paper, we aim to understand the…

Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…

We study the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist selling homogeneous goods to customers over multiple periods. The customers choose their time of purchase to maximize their payoff that depends on their valuation of the product, the…

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

It is a common misconception that in order to make consistent profits as a trader, one needs to posses some extra information leading to an asset value estimation more accurate than that reflected by the current market price. While the idea…

Biological networks often encapsulate promotion/inhibition as signed edge-weights of a graph. Nodes may correspond to genes assigned expression levels (mass) of respective proteins. The promotion/inhibition nature of co-expression between…

We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

We study a natural combinatorial pricing problem for sequentially arriving buyers with equal budgets. Each buyer is interested in exactly one pair of items and purchases this pair if and only if, upon arrival, both items are still available…

In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…

We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…