Related papers: Negative Prices in Network Pricing Games

We introduce the application of online learning in a Stackelberg game pertaining to a system with two learning agents in a dyadic exchange network, consisting of a supplier and retailer, specifically where the parameters of the demand…

This paper proposes a peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help the centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which…

We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller…

Peer-to-peer(P2P) energy trading may increase efficiency and reduce costs, but introduces significant challenges for network operators such as maintaining grid reliability, accounting for network losses, and redistributing costs equitably.…

We explore the influence maximisation problem in networks with negative ties. Where prior work has focused on unsigned networks, we investigate the need to consider negative ties in networks while trying to maximise spread in a population -…

The partition of society into groups, polarization, and social networks are part of most conversations today. How do they influence price competition? We discuss Bertrand duopoly equilibria with demand subject to network effects. Contrary…

This paper considers a multi-user single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for helping the users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay power allocation and pricing problems, and…

Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…

We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Most Vital Links problem, modeled as a one-round adversarial game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker strategically removes up to $k$ edges from a flow network to maximally…

If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…

Game-theoretic inverse learning is the problem of inferring a player's objectives from their actions. We formulate an inverse learning problem in a Stackelberg game between a leader and a follower, where each player's action is the…

We consider pricing and selection with fading channels in a Stackelberg game framework. A channel server decides the channel prices and a client chooses which channel to use based on the remote estimation quality. We prove the existence of…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

We consider a one-round two-player network pricing game, the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree game or StackMST. The game is played on a graph (representing a network), whose edges are colored either red or blue, and where the red edges…

The problem of dynamic pricing of electricity in a retail market is considered. A Stackelberg game is used to model interactions between a retailer and its customers; the retailer sets the day-ahead hourly price of electricity and consumers…

This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…

With the electrification of ride-hailing fleets, there will be a need to incentivize where and when the ride-hailing vehicles should charge. In this work, we assume that a central authority wants to control the distribution of the vehicles…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…