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Speculative execution is an optimization technique that has been part of CPUs for over a decade. It predicts the outcome and target of branch instructions to avoid stalling the execution pipeline. However, until recently, the security…
Memory isolation is critical for system reliability, security, and safety. Unfortunately, read disturbance can break memory isolation in modern DRAM chips. For example, RowHammer is a well-studied read-disturb phenomenon where repeatedly…
Ransomware attacks have increased significantly in recent years, causing great destruction and damage to critical systems and business operations. Attackers are unfailingly finding innovative ways to bypass detection mechanisms,…
DRAM cells are susceptible to Data-Disturbance Errors (DDE), which can be exploited by an attacker to compromise system security. Rowhammer is a well-known DDE vulnerability that occurs when a row is repeatedly activated. Rowhammer can be…
Ransomware core capability, unauthorized encryption, demands controls that identify and block malicious cryptographic activity without disrupting legitimate use. We present a probabilistic, risk-based access control architecture that…
Trojan attack on deep neural networks, also known as backdoor attack, is a typical threat to artificial intelligence. A trojaned neural network behaves normally with clean inputs. However, if the input contains a particular trigger, the…
RowHammer (RH) is a significant and worsening security, safety, and reliability issue of modern DRAM chips that can be exploited to break memory isolation. Therefore, it is important to understand real DRAM chips' RH characteristics.…
This paper proposes MergeGuard, a novel methodology for mitigation of AI Trojan attacks. Trojan attacks on AI models cause inputs embedded with triggers to be misclassified to an adversary's target class, posing a significant threat to…
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is promising for cache applications. However, it brings new data security issues that were absent in volatile memory counterparts such as Static RAM (SRAM) and embedded Dynamic RAM (eDRAM). This is…
Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…
Backdoor (trojan) attacks embed hidden, controllable behaviors into machine-learning models so that models behave normally on benign inputs but produce attacker-chosen outputs when a trigger is present. This survey reviews the rapidly…
Neural network (NN) trojaning attack is an emerging and important attack model that can broadly damage the system deployed with NN models. Existing studies have explored the outsourced training attack scenario and transfer learning attack…
ARM Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) is a new hardware feature introduced in ARMv8.5-A architecture, aiming to detect memory corruption vulnerabilities. The low overhead of MTE makes it an attractive solution to mitigate memory corruption…
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is one of the most popular algorithms to realize an autonomous driving (AD) system. The key success factor of DRL is that it embraces the perception capability of deep neural networks which, however, have…
Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for…
Pre-trained vision models (PVMs) have become a dominant component due to their exceptional performance when fine-tuned for downstream tasks. However, the presence of backdoors within PVMs poses significant threats. Unfortunately, existing…
Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) has emerged as a robust framework for mitigating RowHammer (RH) vulnerabilities in modern DRAM systems. However, we uncover a critical vulnerability: a timing channel introduced by the Alert Back-Off (ABO)…
A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does not hold if the attacker has physical access.…
Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write…
The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known…