Related papers: Quasi-popular Matchings, Optimality, and Extended …
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…
We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
A perfect matching in an undirected graph $G=(V,E)$ is a set of vertex disjoint edges from $E$ that include all vertices in $V$. The perfect matching problem is to decide if $G$ has such a matching. Recently Rothvo{\ss} proved the striking…
Our input is a directed, rooted graph $G = (V \cup \{r\},E)$ where each vertex in $V$ has a partial order preference over its incoming edges. The preferences of a vertex extend naturally to preferences over arborescences rooted at $r$. We…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
For a set A of n applicants and a set I of m items, we consider a problem of computing a matching of applicants to items, i.e., a function M mapping A to I; here we assume that each applicant $x \in A$ provides a preference list on items in…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
We introduce a new and broader formulation of the stable marriage problem (SMP), called the stable polygamy problem (SPP), where multiple individuals from a larger group $L$ of $|L|$ individuals can be matched with a single individual from…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids…
We pursue a study of the Generalized Demand Matching problem, a common generalization of the $b$-Matching and Knapsack problems. Here, we are given a graph with vertex capacities, edge profits, and asymmetric demands on the edges. The goal…
Consider the complete bipartite graph on $n+n$ vertices where the edges are equipped with i.i.d. exponential costs. A matching of the vertices is stable if it does not contain any pair of vertices where the connecting edge is cheaper than…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…