Related papers: Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms fo…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…
Motivated by the shortage of seats that the Chilean school choice system is facing, we introduce the problem of jointly increasing school capacities and finding a student-optimal assignment in the expanded market. Due to the theoretical and…
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools, when students have different utilities for schools and schools have capacity. There are additional group fairness considerations over students that can be captured either by concave…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
In the problem of online learning for changing environments, data are sequentially received one after another over time, and their distribution assumptions may vary frequently. Although existing methods demonstrate the effectiveness of…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform the standard mechanisms to deliver desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension, the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic…
Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms:…
We explore an active learning approach for dynamic fair resource allocation problems. Unlike previous work that assumes full feedback from all agents on their allocations, we consider feedback from a select subset of agents at each epoch of…
In the past few years, several new matching models have been proposed and studied that take into account complex distributional constraints. Relevant lines of work include (1) school choice with diversity constraints where students have…
We study the dynamics of coupled oscillator networks with higher-order interactions and their ability to store information. In particular, the fixed points of these oscillator systems consist of two clusters of oscillators that become…
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching…
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the…
We study social welfare of learning outcomes in mechanisms with admission. In our repeated game there are $n$ bidders and $m$ mechanisms, and in each round each mechanism is available for each bidder only with a certain probability. Our…
In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools.…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
A vast majority of the school choice literature focuses on designing mechanisms to simultaneously assign students to many schools, and employs a "make it up as you go along" approach when it comes to each school's admissions policy. An…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…