Related papers: Principal-agent problem with multiple principals
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
The problem of assigning agents to tasks is a central computational challenge in many multi-agent autonomous systems. However, in the real world, agents are not always perfect and may fail due to a number of reasons. A motivating…
While sequential task assignment for a single agent has been widely studied, such problems in a multi-agent setting, where the agents have heterogeneous task preferences or capabilities, remain less well-characterized. We study a…
This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…
In a decision-making scenario, a principal could use conditional predictions from an expert agent to inform their choice. However, this approach would introduce a fundamental conflict of interest. An agent optimizing for predictive accuracy…
The class of assignment problems is a fundamental and well-studied class in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In a general assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a…
We study the poor-biased model for money exchange introduced in [2]: agents are being randomly picked at a rate proportional to their current wealth, and then the selected agent gives a dollar to another agent picked uniformly at random.…
Norms have been extensively proposed as coordination mechanisms for both agent and human societies. Nevertheless, choosing the norms to regulate a society is by no means straightforward. The reasons are twofold. First, the norms to choose…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
The present bias is a well-documented behavioral trait that significantly influences human decision-making, with present-biased agents often prioritizing immediate rewards over long-term benefits, leading to suboptimal outcomes in various…
We examine hypothesis testing within a principal-agent framework, where a strategic agent, holding private beliefs about the effectiveness of a product, submits data to a principal who decides on approval. The principal employs a hypothesis…
Consider a multi-agent systems setup in which a principal (a supervisor agent) assigns subtasks to specialized agents and aggregates their responses into a single system-level output. A core property of such systems is information…
Load balancing across a networked environment is a monotonous job. Moreover, if the job to be distributed is a constraint satisfying one, the distribution of load demands core intelligence. This paper proposes parallel processing through…
Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…
Complex scheduling problems require a large amount computation power and innovative solution methods. The objective of this paper is the conception and implementation of a multi-agent system that is applicable in various problem domains.…
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
We study a moral hazard problem with adverse selection: a risk-neutral agent can directly control the output distribution and possess private information about the production environment. The principal designs a menu of contracts satisfying…
I study the optimal design of ratings to motivate agent investment in quality when transfers are unavailable. The principal designs a rating scheme that maps the agent's quality to a (possibly stochastic) score. The agent has private…