Related papers: A New Biometric Template Protection using Random O…
Multimodal biometric systems have gained popularity for their enhanced recognition accuracy and resistance to attacks like spoofing. This research explores methods for fusing iris and face feature vectors and implements robust security…
Cancelable biometric schemes are designed to extract an identity-preserving, non-invertible as well as revocable pseudo-identifier from biometric data. Recognition systems need to store only this pseudo-identifier, to avoid tampering and/or…
Cancelable biometrics (CB) employs an irreversible transformation to convert the biometric features into transformed templates while preserving the relative distance between two templates for security and privacy protection. However,…
We explore practical tradeoffs in blockchain-based biometric template storage. We first discuss opportunities and challenges in the integration of blockchain and biometrics, with emphasis in biometric template storage and protection, a key…
With the wide application of biometrics, more and more attention has been paid to the security of biometric templates. However most of existing biometric template protection (BTP) methods have some security problems, e.g. the problem that…
Prior work has shown that multibiometric systems are vulnerable to presentation attacks, assuming that their matching score distribution is identical to that of genuine users, without fabricating any fake trait. We have recently shown that…
Existing fuzzy extractors and similar methods provide an effective way for extracting a secret key from a user's biometric data, but are susceptible to impersonation attack: once a valid biometric sample is captured, the scheme is no longer…
Biometric authentication systems are crucial for security, but developing them involves various complexities, including privacy, security, and achieving high accuracy without directly storing pure biometric data in storage. We introduce an…
The \textit{fuzzy vault} approach is one of the best studied and well accepted ideas for binding cryptographic security into biometric authentication. The vault has been implemented in connection with fingerprint data by Uludag and Jain. We…
Storage of biometric data requires some form of template protection in order to preserve the privacy of people enrolled in a biometric database. One approach is to use a Helper Data System. Here it is necessary to transform the raw…
In this paper, we propose a secure multibiometric system that uses deep neural networks and error-correction coding. We present a feature-level fusion framework to generate a secure multibiometric template from each user's multiple…
Dodis et al. proposed an improved version of the fuzzy vault scheme, one of the most popular primitives used in biometric cryptosystems, requiring less storage and leaking less information. Recently, Blanton and Aliasgari have shown that…
Biometrics have a long-held hope of replacing passwords by establishing a non-repudiated identity and providing authentication with convenience. Convenience drives consumers toward biometrics-based access management solutions. Unlike…
Despite a variety of theoretical-sound techniques have been proposed for biometric template protection, there is rarely practical solution that guarantees non-invertibility, cancellability, non-linkability and performance simultaneously. In…
Biometric systems, while offering convenient authentication, often fall short in providing rigorous security assurances. A primary reason is the ad-hoc design of protocols and components, which hinders the establishment of comprehensive…
We propose a Fourier domain asymmetric cryptosystem for multimodal biometric security. One modality of biometrics (such as face) is used as the plaintext, which is encrypted by another modality of biometrics (such as fingerprint). A private…
The fuzzy vault is an error tolerant authentication method that ensures the privacy of the stored reference data. Several publications have proposed the application of the fuzzy vault to fingerprints, but the results of subsequent analyses…
This paper proposes a non-interactive end-to-end solution for secure fusion and matching of biometric templates using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Given a pair of encrypted feature vectors, we perform the following ciphertext…
This work presents a deeper analysis of the "irreversibility" property of PolyProtect, a biometric template protection method initially proposed for securing face embeddings. PolyProtect transforms embeddings into protected templates via…
Nowadays, facial recognition systems are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks. These attacks vary from simple perturbations of the input image to modifying the parameters of the recognition model to impersonate an authorised subject.…