Related papers: A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combi…
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to players with private preferences in an efficient and fair way. We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is…
We consider a combinatorial auction setting where buyers have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations over the items and the seller's objective is to maximize the social welfare. A prophet inequality in this setting bounds the competitive…
This paper presents a weighted optimization framework that unifies the binary,multi-valued, continuous, as well as mixture of discrete and continuous treatment, under the unconfounded treatment assignment. With a general loss function, the…
This paper establishes a link between endowments, patience types, and the parameters of the HARA Bernoulli utility function that ensure equilibrium uniqueness in an economy with two goods and two impatience types with additive separable…
General Equilibrium Theory is the benchmark of economics, especially its results concerning the efficient allocation of resources, known as the First and Second Welfare Theorems. Yet, General Equilibrium Theory is beyond the scope of most…
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the…
We develop a statistical framework for wealth allocation in which agents hold discrete units of wealth and macrostates are defined by how wealth is distributed across agents. The structure of the economic state space is characterized…
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
Ensembles are a straightforward, remarkably effective method for improving the accuracy,calibration, and robustness of models on classification tasks; yet, the reasons that underlie their success remain an active area of research. We build…
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require bidding on all…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods, yet its existence is unresolved in general. In the setting with few surplus items, where the number of goods exceeds the number of agents by a…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We describe a design-based framework for drawing causal inference in general randomized experiments. Causal effects are defined as linear functionals evaluated at unit-level potential outcome functions. Assumptions about the potential…
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…
We propose a novel combinatorial inference framework to conduct general uncertainty quantification in ranking problems. We consider the widely adopted Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, where each item is assigned a positive preference score…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…