Related papers: Time-Dependent Surveillance-Evasion Games
The multi-cluster games are addressed in this paper, where all players team up with the players in the cluster that they belong to, and compete against the players in other clusters to minimize the cost function of their own cluster. The…
Robots deployed in real-world environments should operate safely in a robust manner. In scenarios where an "ego" agent navigates in an environment with multiple other "non-ego" agents, two modes of safety are commonly proposed --…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
Safe navigation in dense, urban driving environments remains an open problem and an active area of research. Unlike typical predict-then-plan approaches, game-theoretic planning considers how one vehicle's plan will affect the actions of…
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As…
We consider a surveillance-evasion game in an environment with obstacles. In such an environment, a mobile pursuer seeks to maintain the visibility with a mobile evader, who tries to get occluded from the pursuer in the shortest time…
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile resilient to unilateral deviations, and is predominantly used in the analysis of multiagent systems. A downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet,…
Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
We prove that every finite two-person shortest path game, where the local cost of every move is positive for each player, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure stationary strategies, which can be computed in polynomial time. We also extend…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…