Related papers: Hedonic Diversity Games
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition.…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
Hedonic diversity games are a variant of the classical Hedonic games designed to better model a variety of questions concerning diversity and fairness. Previous works mainly targeted the case with two diversity classes (represented as…
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning…
We study PAC learnability and PAC stabilizability of Hedonic Games (HGs), i.e., efficiently inferring preferences or core-stable partitions from samples. We first expand the known learnability/stabilizability landscape for some of the most…
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are given a graph whose vertices represent $n$ selfish agents and the weight of each edge $uv$ denotes how much agent $u$ gains (or loses) when she is placed in…
This paper develops a game-theoretic model and an agent-based model to study group formation driven by resource pooling, spatial cohesion, and heterogeneity. We focus on cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) involving public, private, and…
Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We study coalition formation in the framework of hedonic games. There, a set of agents needs to be partitioned into disjoint coalitions, where agents have a preference order over coalitions. A partition is called popular if it does not lose…
A population of heterogenous agents compeeting through a minority rule is investigated. Agents which frequently loose are selected for evolution by changing their strategies. The stationary composition of the population resulting for this…
This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…
We introduce friend- and enemy-oriented hedonic games with strangers (FOHGS and EOHGS respectively), two classes of hedonic games wherein agents are classified as friends, enemies, or strangers under the assumption that strangers will…
In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling…
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…
We consider the coalition formation games with an additional component, `noisy preferences'. Moreover, such noisy preferences are available only for a sample of coalitions. We propose a multiplicative noise model and obtain the prediction…
This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the…