Related papers: Stealed-bid Auctions: Detecting Bid Leakage via Se…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
Link prediction is a fundamental problem in network science, aiming to infer potential or missing links based on observed network structures. With the increasing adoption of parameterized models, the rigor of evaluation protocols has become…
We consider information leakage to the user in private information retrieval (PIR) systems. Information leakage can be measured in terms of individual message leakage or total leakage. Individual message leakage, or simply individual…
In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to provide "bids" on each submitted paper that express their interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to compute a…
We study the partial and full set-asides and their implication for changes in bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions in the context of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food procurement auctions. Using five years…
The game of bridge consists of two stages: bidding and playing. While playing is proved to be relatively easy for computer programs, bidding is very challenging. During the bidding stage, each player knowing only his/her own cards needs to…
Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who…
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…
We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in…
We study the information leakage to a guessing adversary in index coding with a general message distribution. Under both vanishing-error and zero-error decoding assumptions, we develop lower and upper bounds on the optimal leakage rate,…
We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are…
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…
In display advertising, a small group of sellers and bidders face each other in up to 10 12 auctions a day. In this context, revenue maximisation via monopoly price learning is a high-value problem for sellers. By nature, these auctions are…
We propose a new method for flagging bid rigging, which is particularly useful for detecting incomplete bid-rigging cartels. Our approach combines screens, i.e. statistics derived from the distribution of bids in a tender, with machine…
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to…
We study the performance of the TimeBoost auction, by comparing cumulative fixed time markout of fast lane trades over the TimeBoost interval to bids for the fast lane. Such comparison allows us to assess how well bids predict future…
A major threat to the peer-review systems of computer science conferences is the existence of "collusion rings" between reviewers. In such collusion rings, reviewers who have also submitted their own papers to the conference work together…
We consider the problem of bid prediction in repeated auctions and evaluate the performance of econometric methods for learning agents using a dataset from a mainstream sponsored search auction marketplace. Sponsored search auctions is a…