Related papers: Persuading part of an audience

This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a…

We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…

I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…

A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…

We analyze strategic communication when advice is generated by a reinforcement-learning algorithm rather than by a fully rational sender. Building on the cheap-talk framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982), an advisor adapts its messages…

In the Sznajd model of 2000, a pair of neighbouring agents on a square lattice convinces its six neighbours of the pair opinion if and only if the two agents of the pair share the same opinion. It differs from other consensus models of…

When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…

Influence campaigns in online social networks are often run by organizations, political parties, and nation states to influence large audiences. These campaigns are employed through the use of agents in the network that share persuasive…

We propose an opinion dynamics model that combines processes of vanity and opinion propagation. The interactions take place between randomly chosen pairs. During an interaction, the agents propagate their opinions about themselves and about…

This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with…

We consider theoretical limits of partial secrecy in a setting where an eavesdropper attempts to causally reconstruct an information sequence with low distortion based on an intercepted transmission and the past of the sequence. The…

We introduce the confident voter model, in which each voter can be in one of two opinions and can additionally have two levels of commitment to an opinion --- confident and unsure. Upon interacting with an agent of a different opinion, a…

Lies can have a negating impact on governments, companies, and the society as a whole. Understanding the dynamics of lying is therefore of crucial importance across different fields of research. While lying has been studied before in…

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…

We consider the problem of distributed inference where agents in a network observe a stream of private signals generated by an unknown state, and aim to uniquely identify this state from a finite set of hypotheses. We focus on scenarios…

Presidential debates are viewed as providing an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a challenger (who is privately…

We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a…

We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending \emph{both} positive and negative messages on \emph{multiple} candidates,…

This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits…