Related papers: Mitigating Power Side Channels during Compilation
Security in modern RISC-V processors demands more than functional correctness: It requires resilience to side-channel attacks. This paper evaluates the vulnerability of the side channel of the CVA6 RISC-V core by analyzing software-based…
While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly…
The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has fueled the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) for code-related tasks. These datasets may include sensitive personally identifiable information (PII), which can lead…
In this work, a multi-stage Machine Learning (ML) pipeline is proposed for pipe leakage detection in an industrial environment. As opposed to other industrial and urban environments, the environment under study includes many interfering…
Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…
Modern high-performance as well as power-constrained System-on-Chips (SoC) are increasingly using hardware accelerated encryption engines to secure computation, memory access, and communication operations. The electromagnetic (EM) emission…
Creating high performance implementations of deep learning primitives on CPUs is a challenging task. Multiple considerations including multi-level cache hierarchy, and wide SIMD units of CPU platforms influence the choice of program…
We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often…
This paper presents the interesting observation that by performing fewer of the optimizations available in a standard compiler optimization level such as -O2, while preserving their original ordering, significant savings can be achieved in…
A promising approach to defend against side channel attacks is to build programs that are leakage resilient, in a formal sense. One such formal notion of leakage resilience is the n-threshold-probing model proposed in the seminal work by…
The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data…
Leakage errors arise when the quantum state leaks out of some subspace of interest, for example, the two-level subspace of a multi-level system defining a computational `qubit' or the logical code space defined by some quantum…
Self-modifying code (SMC) allows programs to alter their own instructions, optimizing performance and functionality on x86 processors. Despite its benefits, SMC introduces unique microarchitectural behaviors that can be exploited for…
Inexpensive cloud services, such as serverless computing, are often vulnerable to straggling nodes that increase end-to-end latency for distributed computation. We propose and implement simple yet principled approaches for straggler…
Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptographic implementations, particularly for small devices that are under the physical control of the adversary. While several strategies for protecting against side-channel…
Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…
Fault injection attacks deliberately inject faults into a device via physical channels to disturb its regular execution. Adversaries can effectively deduce secrets by analyzing both the normal and faulty outputs, posing serious threats to…
Quantum error prevention strategies will be required to produce a scalable quantum computing device and are of central importance in this regard. Progress in this area has been quite rapid in the past few years. In order to provide an…
The importance of preventing microarchitectural timing side channels in security-critical applications has surged in recent years. Constant-time programming has emerged as a best-practice technique for preventing the leakage of secret…