Related papers: Inference from Auction Prices
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Meritocratic systems, from admissions to hiring, aim to impartially reward skill and effort. Yet persistent disparities across race, gender, and class challenge this ideal. Some attribute these gaps to structural inequality; others to…
We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor \delta{} in (0,1), and the mechanism designer knows \delta. The classical notions of implementation in…