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In cloud computing environments, multiple tenants are often co-located on the same multi-processor system. Thus, preventing information leakage between tenants is crucial. While the hypervisor enforces software isolation, shared hardware,…

High load latency that results from deep cache hierarchies and relatively slow main memory is an important limiter of single-thread performance. Data prefetch helps reduce this latency by fetching data up the hierarchy before it is…

Many cache designs have been proposed to guard against contention-based side-channel attacks. One well-known type of cache is the randomized remapping cache. Many randomized remapping caches provide fixed or over protection, which leads to…

Distributed caching systems such as content distribution networks often advertise their content via lightweight approximate indicators (e.g., Bloom filters) to efficiently inform clients where each datum is likely cached. While…

There is a long history of side channels in the memory hierarchy of modern CPUs. Especially the cache side channel is widely used in the context of transient execution attacks and covert channels. Therefore, many secure cache architectures…

Microarchitectural timing attacks are a type of information leakage attack, which exploit the time-shared microarchitectural components, such as caches, translation look-aside buffers (TLBs), branch prediction unit (BPU), and speculative…

Microarchitectural attacks are a significant concern, leading to many hardware-based defense proposals. However, different defenses target different classes of attacks, and their impact on each other has not been fully considered. To raise…

Storage resources and caching techniques permeate almost every area of communication networks today. In the near future, caching is set to play an important role in storage-assisted Internet architectures, information-centric networks, and…

Covert channels is a vital setup in the analysing the strength of security in a network.Covert Channel is illegitimate channelling over the secured channel and establishes a malicious conversation.The trapdoor set in such channels…

Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the…

Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…

The massive trend toward embedded systems introduces new security threats to prevent. Malicious firmware makes it easier to launch cyberattacks against embedded systems. Systems infected with malicious firmware maintain the appearance of…

Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…

Distributed caching systems such as content distribution networks often advertise their content via lightweight approximate indicators (e.g., Bloom filters) to efficiently inform clients where each datum is likely cached. While…

Memory corruption vulnerabilities are still a severe threat for software systems. To thwart the exploitation of such vulnerabilities, many different kinds of defenses have been proposed in the past. Most prominently, Control-Flow Integrity…

The rapid growth of data volume and the accompanying congestion problems over the wireless networks have been critical issues to content providers. A novel technique, termed as coded cache, is proposed to relieve the burden. Through…

Scaling up language models has significantly increased their capabilities. But larger models are slower models, and so there is now an extensive body of work (e.g., speculative sampling or parallel decoding) that improves the (average case)…

Recent research shows that colluded malware in different VMs sharing a single physical host may use a resource as a channel to leak critical information. Covert channels employ time or storage characteristics to transmit confidential…

Covert channel attacks have been continuously studied as severe threats to modern computing systems. Software-based covert channels are a typically hard-to-detect branch of these attacks, since they leverage virtual resources to establish…

Cache side-channel attacks lead to severe security threats to the settings that a CPU is shared across users, e.g., in the cloud. The existing attacks rely on sensing the micro-architectural state changes made by victims, and this…