Related papers: Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Va…
Robotic affordance estimation is challenging due to visual, geometric, and semantic ambiguities in sensory input. We propose a method that disambiguates these signals using two coupled recursive estimators for sub-aspects of affordances:…
We study fair division of indivisible goods under the maximin share (MMS) fairness criterion in settings where agents are grouped into a small number of types, with agents within each type having identical valuations. For the special case…
We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the…
We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with $n$ buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering…
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
In the matroid buyback problem, an algorithm observes a sequence of bids and must decide whether to accept each bid at the moment it arrives, subject to a matroid constraint on the set of accepted bids. Decisions to reject bids are…
In this work, we study a scenario where a publisher seeks to maximize its total revenue across two sales channels: guaranteed contracts that promise to deliver a certain number of impressions to the advertisers, and spot demands through an…
This paper deals with a high-order accurate implicit finite-difference approach to the pricing of barrier options. In this way various types of barrier options are priced, including barrier options paying rebates, and options on…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among $n$ strategic agents. It is well-known that truthfulness is incompatible with any meaningful fairness notions. We bypass the strong negative result by considering the concept…
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to…
The transition to auto-bidding in online advertising has shifted the focus of auction theory from quasi-linear utility maximization to value maximization subject to financial constraints. We study mechanism design for buyers with private…
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods. While MMS allocations do not always exist, several approximation techniques have been developed to ensure that all agents receive a fraction…
We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural…
Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…
Employing probabilistic techniques we compute best possible upper and lower bounds on the price of an option on one or two assets with continuous piecewise linear payoff function based on prices of simple call options of possibly distinct…
In today's online advertising markets, a crucial requirement for an advertiser is to control her total expenditure within a time horizon under some budget. Among various budget control methods, throttling has emerged as a popular choice,…