Related papers: Bayesian Elicitation
Learning from demonstrations has gained increasing interest in the recent past, enabling an agent to learn how to make decisions by observing an experienced teacher. While many approaches have been proposed to solve this problem, there is…
Decision tree induction systems are being used for knowledge acquisition in noisy domains. This paper develops a subjective Bayesian interpretation of the task tackled by these systems and the heuristic methods they use. It is argued that…
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…
A binary game is introduced and analysed. N players have to choose one of the two sides independently and those on the minority side win. Players uses a finite set of ad hoc strategies to make their decision, based on the past record. The…
A designer offers vertically-differentiated positions to agents in the absence of transfers. Agents have private outside options and may reject their offers ex-post. The designer has preferences over the quantity of agents who accept each…
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
In many non-cooperative settings, agents often possess useful information that provide an advantage over their opponent(s), but acting on such information too frequently can lead to detection. I develop a simple framework to analyze such a…
Bayesian optimization (BO) developed as an approach for the efficient optimization of expensive black-box functions without gradient information. A typical BO paper introduces a new approach and compares it to some alternatives on simulated…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans…
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…
Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are…
Agents that interact with other agents often do not know a priori what the other agents' strategies are, but have to maximise their own online return while interacting with and learning about others. The optimal adaptive behaviour under…