Related papers: Bayesian Elicitation
We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…
We consider a model of Bayesian observational learning in which a sequence of agents receives a private signal about an underlying binary state of the world. Each agent makes a decision based on its own signal and its observations of…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we…
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that…
Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…
We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form…
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the…
An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent's choices as…
In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to…
Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both…
A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifiably disclose to a receiver. The receiver does not know how…
An agent acquires information dynamically until her belief about a binary state reaches an upper or lower threshold. She can choose any signal process subject to a constraint on the rate of entropy reduction. Strategies are ordered by "time…