Related papers: Optimal Contract Design for Incentive-Based Demand…
Neglecting consumers' comfort always leads to failure or slow-response to demand response request. In this paper, we propose several comprehensive comfort level models for various appliances in campus-based commercial buildings (CBs). The…
In this paper, we propose and study the effectiveness of customer engagement plans that clearly specify the amount of intervention in customer's load settings by the grid operator for peak load reduction. We suggest two different types of…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
Demand response represents a significant but largely untapped resource that can greatly enhance the flexibility and reliability of power systems. This paper proposes a hierarchical control framework to facilitate the integrated coordination…
The large scale deployment of Advanced Metering Infrastructure among residential energy customers has served as a boon for energy systems research relying on granular consumption data. Residential Demand Response aims to utilize the…
We consider the problem of planning the aggregate energy consumption for a set of thermostatically controlled loads for demand response, accounting price forecast trajectory and thermal comfort constraints. We address this as a…
We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…
We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctly representable principal-agent settings. Here optimality means maximizing the principal's expected payoff over all incentive-compatible contracts---known in economics…
Demand Side Response (DSR) is a strategy that enables consumers to actively participate in managing electricity demand. It aims to alleviate strain on the grid during high demand and promote a more balanced and efficient use of (renewable)…
Collaborative machine learning (CML) provides a promising paradigm for democratizing advanced technologies by enabling cost-sharing among participants. However, the potential for rent-seeking behaviors among parties can undermine such…
In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…
Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…
Advanced AI-Generated Content (AIGC) technologies have injected new impetus into teleoperation, further enhancing its security and efficiency. Edge AIGC networks have been introduced to meet the stringent low-latency requirements of…
Demand Response (DR) schemes are effective tools to maintain a dynamic balance in energy markets with higher integration of fluctuating renewable energy sources. DR schemes can be used to harness residential devices' flexibility and to…
We study a demand response problem from utility (also referred to as operator)'s perspective with realistic settings, in which the utility faces uncertainty and limited communication. Specifically, the utility does not know the cost…
We study how governments promote social welfare through the design of contracting environments. We model the regulation of contracting as default delegation: the government chooses a delegation set of contract terms it is willing to…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We…