Related papers: Local Distance Constrained Bribery in Voting
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the…
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted,…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
Determining the complexity of election attack problems is a major research direction in the computational study of voting problems. The paper "Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting…
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all votes. However, in many real-world settings votes come in sequentially, and the briber may have a…
Classical work on metric space based committee selection problem interprets distance as ``near is better''. In this work, motivated by real-life situations, we interpret distance as ``far is better''. Formally stated, we initiate the study…
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…
Prior work on the complexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simultaneously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes come in…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
This paper considers the maximization of the expected maximum value of a portfolio of random variables subject to a budget constraint. We refer to this as the optimal college application problem. When each variable's cost, or each college's…
We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a…
The ridesharing problem is that given a set of trips, each trip consists of an individual, a vehicle of the individual and some requirements, select a subset of trips and use the vehicles of selected trips to deliver all individuals to…
Mobility-on-demand (MoD) ridesharing is a promising way to improve the occupancy rate of personal vehicles and reduce traffic congestion and emissions. Maximizing the number of passengers served and maximizing a profit target are major…
We consider the algorithmic question of choosing a subset of candidates of a given size $k$ from a set of $m$ candidates, with knowledge of voters' ordinal rankings over all candidates. We consider the well-known and classic scoring rule…
In the committee selection problem, the goal is to choose a subset of size $k$ from a set of candidates $C$ that collectively gives the best representation to a set of voters. We consider this problem in Euclidean $d$-space where each…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of $k$ candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a social cost, defined as a function of the distances between…
We study a problem of optimal information gathering from multiple data providers that need to be incentivized to provide accurate information. This problem arises in many real world applications that rely on crowdsourced data sets, but…