Related papers: Can We Prove Time Protection?

Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…

Modern circuits face various threats like reverse engineering, theft of intellectual property (IP), side-channel attacks, etc. Here, we present a novel approach for IP protection based on logic encryption (LE). Unlike established schemes…

Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of these attacks is information leakage across "covert channels"…

Timing-based side or covert channels in processor caches continue to present a threat to computer systems, and they are the key to many of the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Based on improvements to an existing three-step model for…

In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…

Information-theoretic secrecy, in particular the wiretap channel formulation, provides protection against interception of a message by adversary Eve and has been widely studied in the last two decades. In contrast, covert communications…

The standard definition of differential privacy (DP) ensures that a mechanism's output distribution on adjacent datasets is indistinguishable. However, real-world implementations of DP can, and often do, reveal information through their…

As cyber threats continue to evolve and diversify, it has become increasingly challenging to identify the root causes of security breaches that occur between periodic security assessments. This paper explores the fundamental importance of…

Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…

Timing side channels pose a significant threat to the security and privacy of software applications. We propose an approach for mitigating this problem by decreasing the strength of the side channels as measured by entropy-based objectives,…

Embedded neural-network inference can leak information through timing side channels, including leakage caused by the evaluation of activation functions. This work proposes a constant-time implementation methodology for activation functions…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) on low-power microcontrollers (e.g., ARM TrustZone-M) enable isolation of Secure and Non-Secure software but still require both worlds to share resources, including interrupt controllers. In this model,…

The Lightning Network is a scaling solution for Bitcoin that promises to enable rapid and private payment processing. In Lightning, multi-hop payments are secured by utilizing Hashed Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) and encrypted on the…

Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…

Multi-process concurrency is effective in improving program efficiency and maximizing CPU utilization. The correct execution of concurrency is ensured by the mutual exclusion and synchronization mechanism (MESM) that manages the shared…

Developers rely on constant-time programming to prevent timing side-channel attacks. But these efforts can be undone by compilers, whose optimizations may silently reintroduce leaks. While recent works have measured the extent of such…

Erroneous behaviour in safety critical real-time systems may inflict serious consequences. In this paper, we show how to synthesize timed shields from timed safety properties given as timed automata. A timed shield enforces the safety of a…

We address the problem of attack detection and attack correction for multi-output discrete-time linear time-invariant systems under sensor attack. More specifically, we focus on the situation where adversarial attack signals are added to…

We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring…

Quantum temporal correlations exhibited by violations of Leggett-Garg Inequality (LGI) and Temporal Steering Inequality (TSI) are in general found to be non-increasing under decoherence channels when probed on two-qubit pure entangled…