Related papers: Spatial interactions and oscillatory tragedies of …
Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…
The tragedy of the commons (TOC) is an unfortunate situation where a shared resource is exhausted due to uncontrolled exploitation by the selfish individuals of a population. Recently, the paradigmatic replicator equation has been used in…
The tragedy of the commons (TOC) is a ubiquitous social dilemma witnessed in interactions between a population of living entities and shared resources available to them: The individuals in the population tend to selfishly overexploit a…
Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…
The sustainable use of common-pool resources (CPRs) is a major environmental governance challenge because of their possible over-exploitation. Research in this field has overlooked the feedback between user decisions and resource dynamics.…
In a static environment, optional participation and a local agglomeration of cooperators are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper cycles of…
This research investigates the impact of dynamic, time-varying interactions on cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. Traditional research has focused on deterministic rules governing pairwise interactions, yet the impact of interaction…
The productivity of a common pool of resources may degrade when overly exploited by a number of selfish investors, a situation known as the tragedy of the commons (TOC). Without regulations, agents optimize the size of their individual…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third…
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…
The conditions that can lead to the exploitative depletion of a shared resource, i.e, the tragedy of the commons, can be reformulated as a game of prisoner's dilemma: while preserving the common resource is in the best interest of the…
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be…
Oscillatory behaviors are ubiquitous in nature and the human society. However, most previous works fail to reproduce them in the two-strategy game-theoretical models. Here we show that oscillatory behaviors naturally emerge if incomplete…
Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems.…
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods…
Mean field games (MFGs) have been introduced to study Nash equilibria in very large population of self-interested agents. However, when applied to common pool resource (CPR) games, MFG equilibria lead to the so-called tragedy of the commons…
Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…