Related papers: Self-Stabilization Through the Lens of Game Theory
We explore set-stabilizability by constrained controls, and both controllability and stabilizability can be regarded as the special case of set-stabilizability. We not only clarify how to define an equilibrium point of Schr$\ddot{o}$dinger…
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates…
A stabilization theorem for processes of opinion dynamics is presented. The theorem is applicable to a wide class of models of continuous opinion dynamics based on averaging (like the models of Hegselmann-Krause and Weisbuch-Deffuant). The…
In this paper, we examine the stationary relaxed singular control problem within a multi-dimensional framework for a single agent, as well as its mean field game equivalent. We demonstrate that optimal relaxed controls exist for two problem…
This paper studies the problem of stability of a parameterized delay differential equations (DDE see equation (0.1)). After discretizing the DDE (0.1), we show that the problem can be equivalently casted into a semi-definite programming…
This paper investigates the reality and accuracy of evolutionary game dynamics theory in human game behavior experiments. In classical game theory, the central concept is Nash equilibrium, which reality and accuracy has been well known…
Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging,…
We study stochastic static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, with the goal of obtaining (globally) optimal policies under a decentralized information structure. We present sufficient conditions to connect the concepts…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…
The problem of total-order (uniform reliable) broadcast is fundamental in fault-tolerant distributed computing since it abstracts a broad set of problems requiring processes to uniformly deliver messages in the same order in which they were…
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…
Self-stabilization is a versatile technique to withstand any transient fault in a distributed system. Mobile robots (or agents) are one of the emerging trends in distributed computing as they mimic autonomous biologic entities. The…
Justification theory is a unifying semantic framework. While it has its roots in non-monotonic logics, it can be applied to various areas in computer science, especially in explainable reasoning; its most central concept is a justification:…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general $N$-player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cyclical or periodic behavior. Such cycles are fundamental…
This work introduces a new general approach for the numerical analysis of stable equilibria to second order mean field games systems in cases where the uniqueness of solutions may fail. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a simple…
Self-play has powered breakthroughs in two-player and multi-player games. Here we show that self-play is a surprisingly effective strategy in another domain. We show that robust and naturalistic driving emerges entirely from self-play in…