Related papers: A Risk-Sharing Framework of Bilateral Contracts
We study optimal risk sharing among $n$ agents endowed with distortion risk measures. Our model includes market frictions that can either represent linear transaction costs or risk premia charged by a clearing house for the agents. Risk…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
This paper presents a new model for pricing financial derivatives subject to collateralization. It allows for collateral arrangements adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, the model can back out the market price of a collateralized…
The question of pricing and hedging a given contingent claim has a unique solution in a complete market framework. When some incompleteness is introduced, the problem becomes however more difficult. Several approaches have been adopted in…
We study the problem of option pricing and hedging strategies within the frame-work of risk-return arguments. An economic agent is described by a utility function that depends on profit (an expected value) and risk (a variance). In the…
We address the problem of sharing risk among agents with preferences modelled by a general class of comonotonic additive and law-based functionals that need not be either monotone or convex. Such functionals are called distortion…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that…
The paper provides a framework for the assessment and optimization of the total risk of complex distributed systems. The framework takes into account the risk of each agent, which may arise from heterogeneous sources, as well as the risk…
In an incomplete market setting, we consider two financial agents, who wish to price and trade a non-replicable contingent claim. Assuming that the agents are utility maximizers, we propose a transaction price which is a result of the…
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…
We study the range of prices at which a rational agent should contemplate transacting a financial contract outside a given securities market. Trading is subject to nonproportional transaction costs and portfolio constraints and full…
We consider derivatives written on multiple underlyings in a one-period financial market, and we are interested in the computation of model-free upper and lower bounds for their arbitrage-free prices. We work in a completely realistic…
This paper explores the gain maximization problem of two nations engaging in non-cooperative bilateral trade. Probabilistic model of an exchange of commodities under different price systems is considered. Volume of commodities exchanged…
In this paper we provide an alternative framework to tackle the first-best Principal-Agent problem under CARA utilities. This framework leads to both a proof of existence and uniqueness of the solution to the Risk-Sharing problem under very…
Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants: they propose prices at which they stand ready to buy and sell a wide variety of assets. They face a complex optimization problem with both static and dynamic components. They…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {\em two-sided cost sharing} problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur…