Related papers: Revenue maximization with access and information p…
We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…
We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system…
This paper analyzes a service system modeled as a single-server queue, in which the service provider aims to dynamically maximize the expected revenue per unit of time. This is achieved by constructing a stochastic gradient descent…
In this paper, we consider revenue maximization problem for a two server system in the presence of heterogeneous customers. We assume that the customers differ in their cost for unit delay and this is modeled as a continuous random variable…
We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision…
This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations. The arriving customers decide whether to join or to balk the queueing systems based on the information of the queue…
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium strategies in an M/M/1 queue under dynamic service control. The service rate switches between a low and a high value depending on system congestion. Arriving customers do not observe the…
In Naor's model [17], customers decide whether or not to join a queue after observing its length. This work considers a variation in which customers are heterogeneous in their service value (reward) $R$ from completed service and…
Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…
Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…
Consider a multi-class preemptive-resume $M/D/1$ queueing system that supports advance reservations (AR). In this system, strategic customers must decide whether to reserve a server in advance (thereby gaining higher priority) or avoid AR.…
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…
We consider an M/M/1 feedback queue in which service attempts may fail, requiring the customer to rejoin the queue. Arriving customers act strategically, deciding whether to join the queue based on a threshold strategy that depends on the…
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…
We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and…
Consider an M/M/1-type queue where joining attains a known reward, but a known waiting cost is paid per time unit spent queueing. In the 1960s, Naor showed that any arrival optimally joins the queue if its length is less than a known…
We consider Markovian many-server systems with admission control operating in a QED regime, where the relative utilization approaches unity while the number of servers grows large, providing natural Economies-of-Scale. In order to determine…