Related papers: Incentive Compatibility in Stochastic Dynamic Syst…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
Transparency and explainability are important features that responsible autonomous vehicles should possess, particularly when interacting with humans, and causal reasoning offers a strong basis to provide these qualities. However, even if…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Autonomous systems often operate in multi-agent settings and need to make concurrent, strategic decisions, typically in uncertain environments. Verification and control problems for these systems can be tackled with concurrent stochastic…
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of…
We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…
In this paper we study a principal-agent problem in continuous time with multiple lump-sum payments (contracts) paid at different deterministic times. We reduce the non-zero sum Stackelberg game between the principal and agent to a standard…
The high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources in modern smart grids necessitated the development of Demand Response (DR) mechanisms as well as corresponding innovative services for the emerging flexibility markets. From a game theoretic…
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Combinatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We…
As electrical generation becomes more distributed and volatile, and loads become more uncertain, controllability of distributed energy resources (DERs), regardless of their ownership status, will be necessary for grid reliability. Grid…
Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…
We present novel online mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions in which users bid for priority service. We assume that users at the front of their lane are requested to declare their delay cost, i.e. value of time, and that users are…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
We propose a general two-period model where electrical vehicles (EVs) can reserve charging sessions in the day-ahead market and swap them in the real-time market. Under the model, we explore several candidate mechanisms for running the two…
Multi-agent systems (MAS) based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to solve tasks that are beyond the reach of any single LLM. However, this potential can only be realized when the collaboration mechanism between agents is…
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Mixed incentives among a population with multiagent teams has been shown to have advantages over a fully cooperative system; however, discovering the best mixture of incentives or team structure is a difficult and dynamic problem. We…