Related papers: Information flow in a distributed security setting

We propose a simple global computing framework, whose main concern is code migration. Systems are structured in sites, and each site is divided into two parts: a computing body, and a membrane, which regulates the interactions between the…

This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a general concurrency language model, where concurrent objects interact by asynchronous method calls and futures.…

The dependency core calculus (DCC), a simple extension of the computational lambda calculus, captures a common notion of dependency that arises in many programming language settings. This notion of dependency is closely related to the…

Static information flow control (IFC) systems provide the ability to restrict data flows within a program, enabling vulnerable functionality or confidential data to be statically isolated from unsecured data or program logic. Despite the…

A security policy states the acceptable actions of an information system, as the actions bear on security. There is a pressing need for organizations to declare their security policies, even informal statements would be better than the…

Many recent machine learning models rely on fine-grained dynamic control flow for training and inference. In particular, models based on recurrent neural networks and on reinforcement learning depend on recurrence relations, data-dependent…

In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…

Information flow policies are often dynamic; the security concerns of a program will typically change during execution to reflect security-relevant events. A key challenge is how to best specify, and give proper meaning to, such dynamic…

Many important security problems in JavaScript, such as browser extension security, untrusted JavaScript libraries and safe integration of mutually distrustful websites (mash-ups), may be effectively addressed using an efficient…

Large systems are commonly internetworked. A security policy describes the communication relationship between the networked entities. The security policy defines rules, for example that A can connect to B, which results in a directed graph.…

Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…

We present initial results on a comprehensive model of structured communications, in which self- adaptation and security concerns are jointly addressed. More specifically, we propose a model of self-adaptive, multiparty communications with…

This work's main goal is to understand if Information Flow Control (IFC), a security technique used for discovering leaks in software, could be used to indicate the presence of dynamic semantic conflicts between developers contributions in…

Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…

We consider open multi-class queueing networks with general arrival processes, general processing time sequences and Bernoulli routing. The network is assumed to be operating under an arbitrary work-conserving scheduling policy that makes…

The simple security property in an information flow policy can be enforced by encrypting data objects and distributing an appropriate secret to each user. A user derives a suitable decryption key from the secret and publicly available…

There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users…

We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…

Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…

Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…