Related papers: Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design
The design of medium access control protocols for a cognitive user wishing to opportunistically exploit frequency bands within parts of the radio spectrum having multiple bands is considered. In the scenario under consideration, the…
Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…
Classical deterministic optimal control problems assume full information about the controlled process. The theory of control for general partially-observable processes is powerful, but the methods are computationally expensive and typically…
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism…
We consider a type of optimal switching problems with non-uniform execution delays and ramping. Such problems frequently occur in the operation of economical and engineering systems. We first provide a solution to the problem by applying a…
A central challenge in mechanism design is to identify mechanisms whose performance is robust under uncertainty about the environment. The maxmin optimality criterion is commonly used for this purpose, but it often yields a large and…
Electric machine design optimization is a computationally expensive multi-objective optimization problem. While the objectives require time-consuming finite element analysis, optimization constraints can often be based on mathematical…
A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury…
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents, the local compromisers, to every…
This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
In recent years, semidefinite relaxations of common optimization problems in robotics have attracted growing attention due to their ability to provide globally optimal solutions. In many cases, it was shown that specific handcrafted…
Coverage path planning is a fundamental challenge in robotics, with diverse applications in aerial surveillance, manufacturing, cleaning, inspection, agriculture, and more. The main objective is to devise a trajectory for an agent that…
Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents' reward functions may change with…
Since deep neural networks were developed, they have made huge contributions to everyday lives. Machine learning provides more rational advice than humans are capable of in almost every aspect of daily life. However, despite this…
Since its inception, artificial intelligence has relied upon a theoretical foundation centered around perfect rationality as the desired property of intelligent systems. We argue, as others have done, that this foundation is inadequate…
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…
Norms have been extensively proposed as coordination mechanisms for both agent and human societies. Nevertheless, choosing the norms to regulate a society is by no means straightforward. The reasons are twofold. First, the norms to choose…
Reward design is a fundamental problem in reinforcement learning (RL). A misspecified or poorly designed reward can result in low sample efficiency and undesired behaviors. In this paper, we propose the idea of programmatic reward design,…
In this work we deal with the optimal design and optimal control of structures undergoing large rotations. In other words, we show how to find the corresponding initial configuration and the corresponding set of multiple load parameters in…