Related papers: Sanctorum: A lightweight security monitor for secu…
Modern processors can offer hardware primitives that allow a process to run in isolation. These primitives implement a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which a program can run such that the integrity and confidentiality of its…
Trusted executions environments (TEEs) such as Intel(R) SGX provide hardware-isolated execution areas in memory, called enclaves. By running only the most trusted application components in the enclave, TEEs enable developers to minimize the…
Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure data processing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave and ignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, a vulnerable (or…
Hardware-enclaves that target complex CPU designs compromise both security and performance. Programs have little control over micro-architecture, which leads to side-channel leaks, and then have to be transformed to have worst-case control-…
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and hardware attacks outside the enclaves. Recent work introduces…
A number of trusted execution environments (TEEs) have been proposed by both academia and industry. However, most of them require specific hardware or firmware changes and are bound to specific hardware vendors (such as Intel, AMD, ARM, and…
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…
Integrity is critical for maintaining system security, as it ensures that only genuine software is loaded onto a machine. Although confidential virtual machines (CVMs) function within isolated environments separate from the host, it is…
Recent attacks have broken process isolation by exploiting microarchitectural side channels that allow indirect access to shared microarchitectural state. Enclaves strengthen the process abstraction to restore isolation guarantees. We…
Enforcing integrity and confidentiality of users' application code and data is a challenging mission that any software developer working on an online production grade service is facing. Since cryptology is not a widely understood subject,…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a cornerstone for securing sensitive computations by providing isolated enclaves protected from untrusted software. However, their security guarantees are undermined by vulnerabilities…
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…
Hardware enclaves rely on a disjoint memory model, which maps each physical address to an enclave to achieve strong memory isolation. However, this severely limits the performance and programmability of enclave programs. While some prior…
This paper presents an approach to provide strong assurance of the secure execution of distributed event-driven applications on shared infrastructures, while relying on a small Trusted Computing Base. We build upon and extend security…
Trusted-execution environments (TEE), like Intel SGX, isolate user-space applications into secure enclaves without trusting the OS. Thus, TEEs reduce the trusted computing base, but add one to two orders of magnitude slow-down. The…
Isolation is a long-standing challenge of software security. Traditional privilege rings and virtual memory are more and more augmented with concepts such as capabilities, protection keys, and powerful enclaves. At the same time, we are…
Data hosted in a cloud environment can be subject to attacks from a higher privileged adversary, such as a malicious or compromised cloud provider. To provide confidentiality and integrity even in the presence of such an adversary, a number…
Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to software attacks, compromising security of applications as well. To overcome this…
Encrypted database systems provide a great method for protecting sensitive data in untrusted infrastructures. These systems are built using either special-purpose cryptographic algorithms that support operations over encrypted data, or by…