Related papers: Passivity Analysis of Replicator Dynamics and its …
We study the multi-strategy stochastic evolutionary game with death-birth updating in expanding spatial populations of size $N\to \infty$. The model is a voter model perturbation. For typical populations, we require perturbation strengths…
The brain encodes external stimuli through patterns of neural activity, forming internal representations of the world. Recent experiments show that neural representations for a given stimulus change over time. However, the mechanistic…
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However,…
The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence has remained…
To enhance the interpretability of Reinforcement Learning (RL), we propose Revealing Evolutionary Action Consequence Trajectories (REACT). In contrast to the prevalent practice of validating RL models based on their optimal behavior learned…
Record Dynamics (RD) deals with complex systems evolving through a sequence of metastable stages. These are macroscopically distinguishable and appear stationary, except for the sudden and rapid changes, called quakes, which induce the…
Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
Respondent-driven sampling (RDS) is widely used to study hidden or hard-to-reach populations by incentivizing study participants to recruit their social connections. The success and efficiency of RDS can depend critically on the nature of…
We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is non-trivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game…
In this paper, we deal with the equilibrium selection problem, which amounts to steering a population of individuals engaged in strategic game-theoretic interactions to a desired collective behavior. In the literature, this problem has been…
In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the…
The usual passivity theorem considers a closed-loop, the direct chain of which consists of a strictly passive stable operator $H_{1}$, and the feedback chain of which consists of a passive operator $H_{2}$. Then the closed-loop is stable.…