Related papers: Passivity Analysis of Replicator Dynamics and its …
We consider a model of learning and evolution in games whose action sets are endowed with a partition-based similarity structure intended to capture exogenous similarities between strategies. In this model, revising agents have a higher…
Recently, an evolutionary game dynamics model taking into account the environmental feedback has been proposed to describe the co-evolution of strategic actions of a population of individuals and the state of the surrounding environment;…
The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…
The concept of evolutionarily stability and its relation with the fixed points of the replicator equation are important aspects of evolutionary game dynamics. In the light of the fact that oscillating state of a population and individuals…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
The evolution of preferences that account for other agents' fitness, or other-regarding preferences, has been modeled with the "indirect approach" to evolutionary game theory. Under the indirect evolutionary approach, agents make decisions…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
In this paper we address a class of replicator dynamics, referred as polymatrix replicators, that contains well known classes of evolutionary game dynamics, such as the symmetric and asymmetric (or bimatrix) replicator equations, and some…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this work we assume that a…
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
Adaptive dynamics describes a deterministic approximation of the evolution of scalar- and function-valued traits. Applying it to the team game developed by Menden-Deuer and Rowlett [Menden-Deuer & Rowlett 2019], we constructed an…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…