Related papers: Spontaneous cooperation for public goods
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We…
A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game.…
Free-riding on a joint venture bears the risk of losing personal endowment as the group may fail to reach the collective target due to insufficient contributions. A collective-risk social dilemma emerges, which we here study in the realm of…
Most real life systems have a random component: the multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors influencing them result in stochastic fluctuations of the parameters determining their dynamics. These empirical systems are in many cases…
Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
Policy and guideline proposals for ethical artificial-intelligence research have proliferated in recent years. These are supposed to guide the socially-responsible development of AI for the common good. However, there typically exist…
We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from an owner) on a social network. We examine incentives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic models where each node decides whether…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…
From ant-acacia mutualism to performative conflict resolution among Inuit, dedicated punishments between distinct subsets of a population are widespread and can reshape the evolutionary trajectory of cooperation. Existing studies have…
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where…
The Ising model, originally developed for understanding magnetic phase transitions, has become a cornerstone in the study of collective phenomena across diverse disciplines. In this review, we explore how Ising and Ising-like models have…
Cooperators forgo their interest to benefit others. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural selection. It challenges the evolutionists, since cooperation is widespread. As one of the resolutions, information spreading has been…
An elementary Ising spin model is proposed for demonstrating cascading failures (break-downs, blackouts, collapses, avalanches, ...) that can occur in realistic networks for distribution and delivery by suppliers to consumers. A…
In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…
Social dilemmas are central to human society. Depletion of natural resources, climate protection, security of energy supply, and workplace collaborations are all examples of social dilemmas. Since cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…