Related papers: Strategically Simple Mechanisms
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…
In most real-world settings, due to limited time or other resources, an agent cannot perform all potentially useful deliberation and information gathering actions. This leads to the metareasoning problem of selecting such actions.…
Organization concepts and models are increasingly being adopted for the design and specification of multi-agent systems. Agent organizations can be seen as mechanisms of social order, created to achieve global (or organizational) objectives…
There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic…
Strategic Decision-Making is always challenging because it is inherently uncertain, ambiguous, risky, and complex. It is the art of possibility. We develop a systematic taxonomy of decision-making frames that consists of 6 bases, 18…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
As part of a generalized "prisoners' dilemma", is considered that the evolution of a population with a full set of behavioral strategies limited only by the depth of memory. Each subsequent generation of the population successively loses…
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between…
We consider a scheduling problem of strategic agents representing jobs of different weights. Each agent has to decide on one of a finite set of identical machines to get their job processed. In contrast to the common and exclusive focus on…
Strategic reasoning enables agents to cooperate, communicate, and compete with other agents in diverse situations. Existing approaches to solving strategic games rely on extensive training, yielding strategies that do not generalize to new…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a…
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…
Models can be simple for different reasons: because they yield a simple and computationally efficient interpretation of a generic dataset (e.g. in terms of pairwise dependences) - as in statistical learning - or because they capture the…
Determining an individual's strategic reasoning capability based solely on choice data is a complex task. This complexity arises because sophisticated players might have non-equilibrium beliefs about others, leading to non-equilibrium…
Two natural strategy elimination procedures have been studied for strategic games. The first one involves the notion of (strict, weak, etc) dominance and the second the notion of rationalizability. In the case of dominance the criterion of…
Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. While explaining choices made by black-box algorithms such as…
The article considers strategies of coalitions that are based on intelligence information about moves of some of the other agents. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between…