Related papers: Strategy-Proof Spectrum Allocation among Multiple …
In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
In this paper a new mathematical model is proposed for task scheduling and resource allocation in Grid systems. In this novel model, load balancing, starvation prevention and failing strategies are stated as the constraints and the solution…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
Secure spectrum auctions can revolutionize the spectrum utilization of cellular networks and satisfy the ever increasing demand for resources. In this paper, a multi-tier dynamic spectrum sharing system is studied for efficient sharing of…
Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages a large number of sensor-equipped mobile phones to collect sensing data. To attract more participants to provide good quality, bidding mechanisms that solicit the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)…
In this paper we address the problem of fully distributed assignment of users to sub-bands such that the sum-rate of the system is maximized. We introduce a modified auction algorithm that can be applied in a fully distributed way using an…
The resource allocation problem of optimal assignment of the clients to the available access points in 60 GHz millimeterWave wireless access networks is investigated. The problem is posed as a multiassignment optimisation problem. The…
We propose a decentralized auction-based algorithm for the solution of dynamic task allocation problems for spatially distributed multi-agent systems. In our approach, each member of the multi-agent team is assigned to at most one task from…
We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio and perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup,…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
Next generation networks are expected to be ultradense and aim to explore spectrum sharing paradigm that allows users to communicate in licensed, shared as well as unlicensed spectrum. Such ultra-dense networks will incur significant…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
Many popular search engines run an auction to determine the placement of advertisements next to search results. Current auctions at Google and Yahoo! let advertisers specify a single amount as their bid in the auction. This bid is…
This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three…
For decades, Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has been the most popular mechanism used for spectrum auctions. It has recently been employed by many countries for the allocation of 5G licences. Although SAA presents relatively simple…
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of…
This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via long-term contracts, a…
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…
One of the many problems faced by current cellular network technology is the under utilization of the dedicated, licensed spectrum of network operators. An emerging paradigm to solve this issue is to allow multiple operators to share some…