Related papers: Dynamic Competitive Persuasion
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…
We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main…
We study a complementarity game with multiple populations whose members' offered contributions are put together towards some common aim. When the sum of the players' offers reaches or exceeds some threshold K, they each receive K minus…
Prediction markets are often used as mechanisms to aggregate information about a future event, for example, whether a candidate will win an election. The event is typically assumed to be exogenous. In reality, participants may influence the…
We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model called Markovian persuasion. In such a model, the belief of the receiver regarding the current state of a Markov chain $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$, over a finite state space $K$, is controlled through…
This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We explore various extensions of Challet and Zhang's Minority Game in an attempt to gain insight into the dynamics underlying financial markets. First we consider a heterogeneous population where individual traders employ differing `time…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors' actions, chooses whether to acquire a private signal (and its precision), and then…
We show, under weaker assumptions than in the previous literature, that a perpetual optimal stopping game always has a value. We also show that there exists an optimal stopping time for the seller, but not necessarily for the buyer.…
We propose a model of causal persuasion, in which a sender selectively discloses a set of variables together with their true joint distribution and proposes a subjective causal model that binds them. A receiver is persuaded by this model…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…
Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite "play", which determines the winner or payoff of the game.…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…