Related papers: Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configu…

We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots.…

We consider a finite structured population of mobile individuals that strategically explore a network using a Markov movement model and interact with each other via a public goods game. We extend the model of Erovenko et al. (2019) from…

The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate…

We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…

Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we…

In spite of its relevance to the origin of complex networks, the interplay between form and function and its role during network formation remains largely unexplored. While recent studies introduce dynamics by considering rewiring processes…

The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving…

Population structure has been known to substantially affect evolutionary dynamics. Networks that promote the spreading of fitter mutants are called amplifiers of natural selection, and those that suppress the spreading of fitter mutants are…

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…

Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…

Genetic regulatory networks are defined by their topology and by a multitude of continuously adjustable parameters. Here we present a class of simple models within which the relative importance of topology vs. interaction strengths becomes…

Understanding the evolution of cooperation is pivotal in biology and social science. Public resources sharing is a common scenario in the real world. In our study, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on a regular graph with…

Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and…

We introduce a minimal model of multilevel selection on structured populations, considering the interplay between game theory and population dynamics. Through a bottleneck process, finite groups are formed with cooperators and defectors…

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…

We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy as the two emotions…

Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

The spatial structure of an evolving population affects which mutations become fixed. Some structures amplify selection, increasing the likelihood that beneficial mutations become fixed while deleterious mutations do not. Other structures…

Cooperative behaviors are ubiquitous in nature,which is a puzzle to evolutionary biology,because the defector always gains more benefit than the cooperator,thus,the cooperator should decrease and vanish over time.This typical "prisoners'…