Related papers: Interface-Based Side Channel Attack Against Intel …
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…
In this paper, we reveal the existence of a new class of prefetcher, the XPT prefetcher, in the modern Intel processors which has never been officially documented. It speculatively issues a load, bypassing last-level cache (LLC) lookups,…
For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new…
Increasingly Industrial Control Systems (ICS) systems are being connected to the Internet to minimise the operational costs and provide additional flexibility. These control systems such as the ones used in power grids, manufacturing and…
Side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic devices. They use only quantities observable from outside, such as the duration and the power consumption. Attacks against synchronous devices using electric observations are…
Cache side-channel attacks lead to severe security threats to the settings that a CPU is shared across users, e.g., in the cloud. The existing attacks rely on sensing the micro-architectural state changes made by victims, and this…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
Multi-GPU systems are becoming increasingly important in highperformance computing (HPC) and cloud infrastructure, providing acceleration for data-intensive applications, including machine learning workloads. These systems consist of…
Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode…
We use browsers daily to access all sorts of information. Because browsers routinely process scripts, media, and executable code from unknown sources, they form a critical security boundary between users and adversaries. A common attack…
Artificial Intelligence (AI) hardware accelerators have been widely adopted to enhance the efficiency of deep learning applications. However, they also raise security concerns regarding their vulnerability to power side-channel attacks…
Encrypting data before sending it to the cloud protects it against hackers and malicious insiders, but requires the cloud to compute on encrypted data. Trusted (hardware) modules, e.g., secure enclaves like Intel's SGX, can very efficiently…
Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…
In this paper we propose a data dissemination platform that supports data security and different privacy levels even when the platform and the data are hosted by untrusted infrastructures. The proposed system aims at enabling an application…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
Covert channels can be utilized to secretly deliver information from high privileged processes to low privileged processes in the context of a high-assurance computing system. In this case study, we investigate the possibility of covert…
New trusted computing primitives such as Intel SGX have shown the feasibility of running user-level applications in enclaves on a commodity trusted processor without trusting a large OS. However, the OS can still compromise the integrity of…
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…
Intel SGX provisions shielded executions for security-sensitive computation, but lacks support for trusted system services (TSS), such as clock, network and filesystem. This makes \textit{enclaves} vulnerable to Iago…