Related papers: On convexity and solution concepts in cooperative …

The success of modern civilization is built upon widespread cooperation in human society, deciphering the mechanisms behind has being a major goal for centuries. A crucial fact is, however, largely missing in most prior studies that games…

In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…

We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is defined as the limiting superdifferential of the Lovasz extension and thus it completes the…

In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

In many applications of cooperative game theory -- from corporate governance and cartel formation to parliamentary voting -- not all winning coalitions are feasible. Ideological distances, institutional constraints, or pre-electoral…

Shapley value is a concept in cooperative game theory for measuring the contribution of each participant, which was named in honor of Lloyd Shapley. Shapley value has been recently applied in data marketplaces for compensation allocation…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…

We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…

We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…

In this paper, we study the total displacement statistic of parking functions from the perspective of cooperative game theory. We introduce parking games, which are coalitional cost-sharing games in characteristic function form derived from…

The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the…

The Shapley value concept from cooperative game theory has become a popular technique for interpreting ML models, but efficiently estimating these values remains challenging, particularly in the model-agnostic setting. Here, we revisit the…

Communication games are collaborative information processing tasks involving a number of players with limited communication. Such games are useful tools for studying physical theories. A physical theory exhibits preparation contextuality…

The Shapley value is the solution concept in cooperative game theory that is most used in both theoretical as practical settings. Unfortunately, computing the Shapley value is computationally intractable in general. This paper focuses on…

An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…