Related papers: Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
The goal of this article is to investigate how human participants allocate their limited time to decisions with different properties. We report the results of two behavioral experiments. In each trial of the experiments, the participant…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
We study repeated resource allocation with strategic agents, where monetary transfers are disallowed and the planner has no prior information on agents' utility distributions. Inspired by the costly state verification literature, we assume…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…
Artificial learning agents are mediating a larger and larger number of interactions among humans, firms, and organizations, and the intersection between mechanism design and machine learning has been heavily investigated in recent years.…
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…
In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network,…
We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
We consider a distributed detection system with communication constraints, where several nodes are arranged in an arbitrary tree topology, under the assumption of conditionally independent observations. We propose a cyclic design procedure…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
Service system performance depends on how participants respond to design choices, but modeling these responses is hard due to the complexity of human behavior. We introduce an LLM-powered multi-agent simulation (LLM-MAS) framework for…
Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma…
We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system that is jointly controlled by two strategic agents. There is a system designer that has its own reward function but does not have direct control over the agents' actions. We consider…
We study the excludable public project model where the decision is binary (build or not build). In a classic excludable and binary public project model, an agent either consumes the project in its whole or is completely excluded. We study a…
Models often need to be constrained to a certain size for them to be considered interpretable. For example, a decision tree of depth 5 is much easier to understand than one of depth 50. Limiting model size, however, often reduces accuracy.…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her…