Related papers: Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of…
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participating agents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). In particular, we consider mechanism design for systems where the agents are modeled as…
We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to…
We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
In the mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of all agents' types. Traditionally, the designer may be in a dilemma in the…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice…
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mechanism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation…