Related papers: Flexible Representative Democracy: An Introduction…
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an…
Robust Markov decision processes (r-MDPs) extend MDPs by explicitly modelling epistemic uncertainty about transition dynamics. Learning r-MDPs from interactions with an unknown environment enables the synthesis of robust policies with…
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
Diffusion-based models have achieved notable empirical successes in reinforcement learning (RL) due to their expressiveness in modeling complex distributions. Despite existing methods being promising, the key challenge of extending existing…
Empirical regression discontinuity (RD) studies often include covariates in their specifications to increase the precision of their estimates. In this paper, we propose a novel class of estimators that use such covariate information more…
When confronted with a host of issues, groups often save time and energy by compiling many issues into a single bundle when making decisions. This reduces the time and cost of group decision-making, but it also leads to suboptimal outcomes…
This article proposes a hybrid adaptive numerical method based on the Dual Reciprocity Method (DRM) to solve problems with non-linear boundary conditions and large-scale problems, named Hybrid Adaptive Dual Reciprocity Method (H-DRM). The…
We analyse optimal voting weights in two-tier voting systems. In our model, the overall population (or union) is split in groups (or member states) of different sizes. The individuals comprising the overall population constitute the first…
Social choice theory is the study of preference aggregation across a population, used both in mechanism design for human agents and in the democratic alignment of language models. In this study, we propose the representative social choice…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard…
Traditional distributed deep reinforcement learning (RL) commonly relies on exchanging the experience replay memory (RM) of each agent. Since the RM contains all state observations and action policy history, it may incur huge communication…
Computing and storing probabilities is a hard problem as soon as one has to deal with complex distributions over multiple random variables. The problem of efficient representation of probability distributions is central in term of…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very small representation. However, these thresholds often result…
Democracy often fails to meet its ideals, and these failures may be made worse by electoral institutions. Unwanted outcomes include polarized institutions, unresponsive representatives, and the ability of a faction of voters to gain power…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
The successor representation (SR) provides a powerful framework for decoupling predictive dynamics from rewards, enabling rapid generalisation across reward configurations. However, the classical SR is limited by its inherent policy…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, ...), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and…