Related papers: When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist?
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…
We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL…
We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every…
This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents, with a focus on limiting envy. A central open question in this area is the existence of EFX allocations-allocations in which any envy of any agent i towards any agent j…
The existence of EFX allocations is a central open problem in discrete fair division. An allocation is EFX (envy-free up to any good) if no agent envies another agent after the removal of any single good from the other agent's bundle. We…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to couples, where each couple consists of two agents with distinct additive valuations. We show that there exist instances of allocating indivisible items to $n$ couples for…
We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…
In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents with…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
We consider the problem of allocating a distribution of items to $n$ recipients where each recipient has to be allocated a fixed, prespecified fraction of all items, while ensuring that each recipient does not experience too much envy. We…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
We study the fair division of indivisible items. In the general model, the goal is to allocate $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents while satisfying fairness criteria such as MMS, EF1, and EFX. We also study a recently-introduced graphical…