Related papers: Multi-Round Cooperative Search Games with Multiple…

We consider a game-theoretic setting in which selfish individuals compete over resources of varying quality. The motivating example is a group of animals that disperse over patches of food of different abundances. In such scenarios,…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

Data mining and knowledge discovery are two important growing research fields in the last two decades due to the abundance of data collected from various sources. The exponentially growing volumes of generated data urge the development of…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

We study a contest in which $N$ players sequentially draw from a distribution as many times as they want at a fixed cost per draw, with no recall, and the highest accepted value wins a prize. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the…

This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…

We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…

In this work we study of competitive situations among users of a set of global resources. More precisely we study the effect of cost policies used by these resources in the convergence time to a pure Nash equilibrium. The work is divided in…

We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…

This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…

In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…

Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…