Related papers: New algorithms for solving stochastic games

In a zero-sum stochastic game, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by them and by a controlled random variable representing the state of nature. The total payoff is the normalized…

We investigate the increasingly important and common game-solving setting where we do not have an explicit description of the game but only oracle access to it through gameplay, such as in financial or military simulations and computer…

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the cost of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the…

We consider some well-known families of two-player, zero-sum, perfect information games that can be viewed as special cases of Shapley's stochastic games. We show that the following tasks are polynomial time equivalent: - Solving simple…

Weighted timed games are two-player zero-sum games played in a timed automaton equipped with integer weights. We consider optimal reachability objectives, in which one of the players, that we call Min, wants to reach a target location while…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games cover as a very special case the classic two-person…

We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…

In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning…

This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…

Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. {\em Optimization} is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization…

We consider multiplayer stochastic games in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin (1998) and Maitra and Sudderth (1998), we show…

We show that computing approximate stationary Markov coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in general-sum stochastic games is computationally intractable, even when there are two players, the game is turn-based, the discount factor is an…

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the constraints that optimal solutions need to satisfy, and…

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…