Related papers: Intermediated Implementation
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
Contemporary recommender systems act as intermediaries on multi-sided platforms serving high utility recommendations from sellers to buyers. Such systems attempt to balance the objectives of multiple stakeholders including sellers, buyers,…
We study delegated Bayesian persuasion: a principal incentivizes an intermediary to design information via outcome-contingent transfers, while the intermediary privately chooses the experiment subject to convex costs. We characterize…
In practice, incentive providers (i.e., principals) often cannot observe the reward realizations of incentivized agents, which is in contrast to many principal-agent models that have been previously studied. This information asymmetry…
This paper discusses an interested party who wishes to influence the behavior of agents in a game (multi-agent interaction), which is not under his control. The interested party cannot design a new game, cannot enforce agents' behavior,…
We study principal-agent problems where a farsighted agent takes costly actions in an MDP. The core challenge in these settings is that agent's actions are hidden to the principal, who can only observe their outcomes, namely state…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
Implicit bias is the unconscious attribution of particular qualities (or lack thereof) to a member from a particular social group (e.g., defined by gender or race). Studies on implicit bias have shown that these unconscious stereotypes can…
In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…
We consider Incentive Decision Processes, where a principal seeks to reduce its costs due to another agent's behavior, by offering incentives to the agent for alternate behavior. We focus on the case where a principal interacts with a…
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
In hybrid populations where humans delegate strategic decision-making to autonomous agents, understanding when and how cooperative behaviors can emerge remains a key challenge. We study this problem in the context of energy load management:…
One of the most essential parts of any recommender system is personalization-- how acceptable the recommendations are from the user's perspective. However, in many real-world applications, there are other stakeholders whose needs and…
We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and induce socially optimal outcome in terms of some given social…
This paper proposes the Potluck Problem as a model for the behavior of independent producers and consumers under standard economic assumptions, as a problem of resource allocation in a multi-agent system in which there is no explicit…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…