Related papers: Revealed Stochastic Preference: A One-Paragraph Pr…
The Random Utility Model (RUM) is the gold standard in describing the behavior of a population of consumers. The RUM operates under the assumption of transitivity in consumers' preference relationships, but the empirical literature has…
Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. Moreover, studying preferences over menus is not possible with this…
Random utility theory models an agent's preferences on alternatives by drawing a real-valued score on each alternative (typically independently) from a parameterized distribution, and then ranking the alternatives according to scores. A…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an…
Eliciting preferences from human judgements is inherently imprecise, yet most decision analysis methods force a single priority vector from pairwise comparisons, discarding the information embedded in inconsistencies. We instead leverage…
Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We define an…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…
This paper is dedicated to a cautious learning methodology for predicting preferences between alternatives characterized by binary attributes (formally, each alternative is seen as a subset of attributes). By "cautious", we mean that the…
Incorporating graph side information into recommender systems has been widely used to better predict ratings, but relatively few works have focused on theoretical guarantees. Ahn et al. (2018) firstly characterized the optimal sample…
We analyse a preferential urn model with randomness using the replica method. The preferential urn model is a stochastic model based on the concept "the rich get richer." The replica analysis clarifies that the preferential urn model with…
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of Revealed Preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat's theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in…
With recent advances in natural language processing, rationalization becomes an essential self-explaining diagram to disentangle the black box by selecting a subset of input texts to account for the major variation in prediction. Yet,…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…
This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of…