Related papers: Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games: Boundin…
Let $G = (N,E,w)$ be a weighted communication graph (with weight function $w$ on $E$). For every subset $A \subseteq N$, we delete in the subset $E(A)$ of edges with ends in $A$, all edges of minimum weight in $E(A)$. Then the connected…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of…
We show that given an explicit description of a multiplayer game, with a classical verifier and a constant number of players, it is QMA-hard, under randomized reductions, to distinguish between the cases when the players have a strategy…
The Bier sphere $Bier(\mathcal{G}) = Bier(K) = K\ast_\Delta K^\circ$ and the canonical fan $Fan(\Gamma) = Fan(K)$ are combinatorial/geometric companions of a simple game $\mathcal{G} = (P,\Gamma)$ (equivalently the associated simplicial…
We consider approximating the minmax value of a multi-player game in strategic form. Tightening recent bounds by Borgs et al., we observe that approximating the value with a precision of epsilon log n digits (for any constant epsilon>0 is…
Cooperative games with nonempty core are called balanced, and the set of balanced games is a polyhedron. Given a game with empty core, we look for the closest balanced game, in the sense of the (weighted) Euclidean distance, i.e., the…
In this paper, we propose a pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for finding a payoff vector in the least core of a weighted voting game. The numbers of variables and constraints in our formulation are both bounded by $\mbox{O}(n W_+)$,…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…
A natural partial ordering exists on the set of all weighted games and, more broadly, on all linear games. We describe several properties of the partially ordered sets formed by these games and utilize this perspective to enumerate proper…
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the…
The UNIQUE GAMES problem is a central problem in algorithms and complexity theory. Given an instance of UNIQUE GAMES, the STRONG UNIQUE GAMES problem asks to find the largest subset of vertices, such that the UNIQUE GAMES instance induced…
We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of $j$ given losing coalitions into a set of $j$ winning coalitions.…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
In many situations, both in human and artificial societies, cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity and it is not uncommon that certain actions are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria,…
Every simple game is a monotone Boolean function. For the other direction we just have to exclude the two constant functions. The enumeration of monotone Boolean functions with distinguishable variables is also known as the Dedekind's…
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected,…