Related papers: On a Conjecture for Dynamic Priority Queues and Na…
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…
We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…
A single server commences its service at time zero every day. A random number of customers decide when to arrive to the system so as to minimize the waiting time and tardiness costs. The costs are proportional to the waiting time and the…
In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…
We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…
We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before…
A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the scheduling policy or the state of other queues. A game theoretic…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…
We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…
This paper examines a single-server queueing system that serves both scheduled and strategic walk-in customers. The service discipline follows a first-come, first-served policy, with scheduled customers granted non-preemptive priority. Each…
A quantum financial approach to finite games of strategy is addressed, with an extension of Nash's theorem to the quantum financial setting, allowing for an entanglement of games of strategy with two-period financial allocation problems…
We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and…
A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…