Related papers: How to share a cake with a secret agent
Consider the communication efficient secret sharing problem. A dealer wants to share a secret with $n$ parties such that any $k\leq n$ parties can reconstruct the secret and any $z<k$ parties eavesdropping on their shares obtain no…
In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way --- giving each agent a piece with a value of at least 1/n of the total. In…
Almost all known secret sharing schemes work on numbers. Such methods will have difficulty in sharing graphs since the number of graphs increases exponentially with the number of nodes. We propose a secret sharing scheme for graphs where we…
The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to allocate goods to agents so that each agent's bundle…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic…
This paper proposes a cake-cutting protocol using cryptography when the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by an interval on a real line. Although the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol with one knife achieves simple…
A (k,n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme allows for a string to be split into n shares in such a way that any subset of at least k shares suffices to recover the secret string, but such that any subset of at most k-1 shares contains no…
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…
In Fair AI literature, the practice of maliciously creating unfair models that nevertheless satisfy fairness constraints is known as "cherry-picking". A cherry-picking model is a model that makes mistakes on purpose, selecting bad…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods across groups of agents, where each agent fully enjoys all goods allocated to their group. We focus on groups of two (couples) and other groups of small size. For two couples, an EF1…
We study the classical rent division problem, where $n$ agents must allocate $n$ indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent $R$. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent's room and rent…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
The gossip problem, in which information (known as secrets) must be shared among a certain number of agents using the minimum number of calls, is of interest in the conception of communication networks and protocols. We extend the gossip…
In the paper we discuss how to share the secrets, that are graphs. So, far secret sharing schemes were designed to work with numbers. As the first step, we propose conditions for "graph to number" conversion methods. Hence, the existing…
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
Secret sharing is a procedure for sharing a secret among a number of participants such that only the qualified subsets of participants have the ability to reconstruct the secret. Even in the presence of eavesdropping, secret sharing can be…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
We study a discrete fair division problem where $n$ agents have additive valuation functions over a set of $m$ goods. We focus on the well-known $\alpha$-EFX fairness criterion, according to which the envy of an agent for another agent is…